We conduct a controlled field experiment in 52 communities in rural Bolivia to investigate the effect that local authorities have on voluntary public good provision. In our study, community members pool resources to provide environmental education material for local schools. We find that voluntary contributions increase when democratically elected local authorities lead by example. The results are driven by two factors: (1) authorities, like other individuals, give more when they are called upon to lead, and (2) high leader contributions increase the likelihood that others follow. Both effects are stronger when authorities, as compared to randomly selected community members, lead by example. We explore two underlying sources of leadership influence. First, we provide evidence that the effect of a leader's contribution is not limited to signaling the quality of the public good. Second, we examine how leader characteristics affect the likelihood that others follow. Specifically, our study shows that authority influence is driven by a combination of formal leadership status, observable characteristics, and the amount authorities contribute when they lead.
Introduction
Leaders play a central role in the resolution of collective action problems. Existing evidence demonstrates that leaders affect growth at the aggregate level (Jones & Olken 2005) and influence the choice of public goods provided at the local level (Chattopadhyay & Duflo 2004) . Most studies of leadership and public good provision focus on public goods that are provided by the government.
1 In spite of the importance of voluntary contributions for the resolution of local-level collective action problems, less is known about the effect leaders have on the voluntary provision of public goods. Recent work has shown that leaders can affect voluntary contributions through informal taxation (Olken & Singhal 2011) , sanction enforcement (Grossman & Baldassarri 2012) , and reciprocity (Beekman et al. 2011) . This paper examines another mechanism by which leaders may affect voluntary contributions to local public goods: leadership by example.
In a voluntary contribution setting, leadership by example arises when individuals make sequential decisions, and the choice made by the first mover (the leader) influences the contributions of others. A substantial theoretical and experimental literature has shown that first movers can affect voluntary contributions in sequential decision settings through free-riding (Varian 1994) , information signaling (Hermalin 1998; Vesterlund 2003; Potters et al. 2005 Potters et al. , 2007 Andreoni 2006; Hermalin 2007; Bag & Roy 2011) , reciprocity (Andreoni et al. 2002; Meidinger & Villeval 2002; Gächter et al. 2010b ) and social status (Kumru & Vesterlund 2010; Eckel et al. 2010) . Due perhaps to the challenge of empirical identification of leadership influence in field settings, no study has examined how the example set by individuals who occupy actual leadership positions affects the voluntary contributions of the groups they lead. Our paper begins to fill this gap in the literature by conducting a randomized field experiment in rural Bolivia that investigates two questions: (1) Do local leaders (authorities) affect voluntary public good provision through their example?, and (2) If so, why? Our experiment examines the effect of leadership on the contributions of both leaders and followers, and tests the role of information signaling about the quality of the public good as a causal mechanism of leadership influence.
We implement a controlled field experiment in 52 socially and politically independent communities, each of which has its own elected local authority.
2 In our experiment, a representative sample of community members pool resources to provide environmental education books for the local school. 3 We employ a between-subject design that solicits voluntary contributions in a natural decision setting and compare public good provision when an authority makes an initial public voluntary contribution-and other group members make private voluntary contributions after observing the authority's choice-to two types of controls: one in which a randomly selected community member makes an initial public contribution and one in which all contributions are private. Two of the three treatments are implemented simultaneously in each community, facilitating the use of fixed effects to address unobservable community-level confounds.
4
Our results show that local authorities increase average voluntary public good provision when they lead by example. The effect is unique to authorities; randomly selected individuals have little effect on overall giving when they lead. We decompose treatment effects into leader and follower responses to leadership. Our results show that authorities not only contribute more than non-authorities when they lead by example, they also influence follower contributions. Followers of authorities are more likely to make a low contribution after observing a low leader contribution, and the probability that their contribution is high is significantly greater after observing a high leader contribution. Randomly selected leaders do not exert the same influence over the contribution decisions of their followers.
We offer two pieces of evidence on why leaders affect public good provisions in our setting. First, our study is designed to identify information signaling as a mechanism through which leaders influence followers. We exogenously vary whether or not participants receive information about the quality of the public good. Informed participants are less responsive than uninformed participants to the example set by randomly selected leaders, but not to the example set by community authorities. This result suggests that other mechanisms such as social status or reciprocity may also contribute to the observed authority leader effects. Second, we examine the relative importance of the authority's formal leadership position in the community and his or her observable characteristics. In our study, community members randomly selected to lead who are similar to local authorities on observable characteristics both make higher contributions to the public good and have a greater influence over the contribution decisions of others, i.e. they have the same effect on provision as authorities in a leadership role. This finding provides suggestive evidence that authorities are influential because of the types of individuals they are, not just the formal position they hold. The effect of authority contributions on followers can be thus attributed to a combination of authority status, observable characteristics, and the fact that authority leaders contribute more to the public good than do random individuals given the opportunity to lead.
Our study is the first to examine how local authorities affect voluntary public good provision without the use of sanctions or coercion and thus makes several contributions to the literature. First, we empirically identify leadership by example as a mechanism through which local authorities can affect the voluntary provision of real public goods in a development setting. Second, we show that the leadership influence of local authorities on aggregate public good provision is explained both by their own contribution and the effect that they have on the contribution decisions of others. Third, we offer novel support for one of the most studied channels underlying leadership by example -information signaling -but show that its empirical relevance depends on who is in the leadership role. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that authorities are influential because of their formal leadership position, their elevated contributions when placed in a leadership role, and their observable characteristics; traits such as education and wealth, which are correlated with several potential mechanisms of authority influence, matter.
Our study relates to a small but growing number of controlled field studies that examine the relationship between leaders and public good contributions in developing countries. Using public good games in the field, Grossman and Baldassari (2012) find that individuals elected within the experiment -who are not local authorities -are more effective at sanctioning low voluntary contributions to public goods, while Beekman et al. (2011) show that voluntary contributions are lower in communities that have corrupt officials. More similar to our study, d 'Adda (2012) conducts an artefactual field experiment in 6 villages in rural Colombia that investigates how social information interacts with social status, defined endogenously along leadership dimensions, in a repeated voluntary contribution setting. Her results show that high status individuals (leaders elected within the experiment) are more likely to make high contributions and are less influenced by the contribution decisions of others. Our study is unique in this literature in that we study actual authorities, vary leadership exogenously, and use a one-shot setting in which voluntary contributions acquire an actual public good and in which both leaders and followers can react to leadership.
In trading off the the control of the laboratory for the realism of the field, our study encounters some limitations. First, in order to investigate both leader and follower responses to leadership we allow leader contributions to arise endogenously in our experiment. This design feature reveals whether or not authorities take advantage of leadership opportunities, but prevents us from cleanly separating the effect of leader contributions from leader characteristics and leader type when analyzing follower responses. Second, a small number of communities could not comply with treatment randomization for idiosyncratic reasons. Our findings are robust to correcting for any resulting selection bias.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a conceptual framework for leadership in public goods provision. Section 3 describes the experimental context and design. Section 4 describes the main results, treatment heterogeneities and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes our work.
Conceptual framework
Early theoretical literature on sequential giving showed that leadership by example is weakly detrimental for voluntary public good provision when information is perfect and individuals are solely motivated by altruism (Varian 1994) . This result emerges because the positive externalities generated by public goods introduce a free-riding incentive that induces first movers, leaders, to make low initial contributions that force followers to provide the public good. Subsequent theoretical and empirical studies have, nevertheless, shown that sequential giving can be beneficial for public good provision. Three primary classes of mechanisms underlie these positive results: (1) information signaling, (2) social preferences, and (3) social status. Our empirical design only facilitates the empirical identification of information signaling as a causal mechanism of leadership influence, but to help interpret our results, we describe all the mechanisms by which actual leaders may affect overall giving below.
First, models of information signaling have shown that sequential giving can have beneficial effects on voluntary public good provision when at least one of two types of informational asymmetries are present: (1) uncertainty about the common value of the public good, and/or (2) uncertainty about private valuations of the public good. If the common value of the public good is uncertain and the leader has an informational advantage over others, he or she may signal such information through his or her contribution decision (Hermalin 1998; Vesterlund 2003; Potters et al. 2005; Andreoni 2006; Hermalin 2007) .
5 The leader can signal if a public good is of high (low) value by making a high (low) contribution that induces others to follow. Although level predictions are conditional on the underlying information in the hands of the leader, information signaling is always welfare enhancing in this setting. If individuals have independent private valuations for the public good and such information is not common knowledge, then leadership by example can, theoretically, positively affect public good provision through the resolution of the underlying strategic uncertainty (Bag & Roy 2011) .
Second, sequential giving can positively affect public good provision when individuals have social preferences that include reciprocity, equity, and fairness concerns (Meidinger & Villeval 2002; Huck & Rey-Biel 2006; Potters et al. 2005 Potters et al. , 2007 .
6 Leaders who make high contributions crowd-in the contributions of subsequent movers. They cannot use their first mover advantage to free-ride (as in Varian 1994) because reciprocal followers punish free-riding at a cost. 7 Social preferences could even transform the social dilemma into a coordination problem (Bicchieri 2005) . Sequential giving is beneficial for coordination because it improves equilibrium selection in groups.
Third, social status can affect public good provision when individuals with high social status lead and followers like to be associated with high status others (Kumru & Vesterlund 2010) or want to acquire status ).
8 Status can also be modeled as the location individuals occupy in a social network (center vs. periphery), and explain leadership 5 All of the references cited present theoretical models of information signaling and voluntary contributions (or team effort in the case of Hermalin 1998 Hermalin , 2007 . Potters et al. (2005 Potters et al. ( , 2007 provide laboratory evidence supporting these results. Field studies that have investigated information signaling within the context of voluntary contributions include Karlan & List (2012) and Smith et al. (2013) . While Karlan & List (2012) examine information signaling within the context of matching grants in charitable giving, Smith et al. (2013) investigate peer effects in charity fundraising conducted by individuals on-line. The latter study does not evidence in support of information signaling about the quality of of the non-profit organization. The form of leadership we study differs from these field studies in that we require the leaders to set an example by making a one-time costly and unrecoverable contribution before others; the leader does not observe the decisions of others and cannot make contributions at a later time.
6 With the exception of Huck & Rey-Biel (2006) , all the papers that examine reciprocity within the context of sequential voluntary contributions are empirical. They conduct laboratory tests that isolate reciprocity by removing other possible mechanisms of leadership influence.
7 Andreoni et al. (2002) and Gächter et al. (2010a) compare simultaneous and sequential giving in the laboratory when information is perfect and show that although leaders try to free-ride off of followers, followers punish free-riding by giving less than their best response function predicts.
8 Both papers provide laboratory evidence. Related to this literature is also the empirical work on prestige and visibility motives for giving. See, for example, Harbaugh (1998) , Ariely et al. (2009) and Karlan & McConnell (2012) .
influence on voluntary contribution decisions through the number of agents that observe the leader's choice (Eckel et al. 2010 ).
9
What is the effect of leadership by example on public good provision in the field, when a local authority assumes the role of first mover? Do Varian's (1994) free-riding predictions hold or are effects consistent with one or more of the channels underlying positive leadership by example effects? Each of the mechanisms that allow leadership to positively influence public good provision may be active when any individual leads by example, but the existing literature suggests that effects should be amplified when a local authority leads.
For example, authorities may possess superior information about the value of the public good. They may have been elected precisely because of this informational advantage, or may have acquired such information through their formal leadership role.
10 Authorities may generate more reciprocity among community members due to their authority position and may even cause a reduction in strategic uncertainty when coordination incentives are present. Authorities may have higher social status than the average community member. They may be wealthier, more educated, and even possess higher social status as a direct result of the formal leadership position they occupy in the community. Finally, other factors such as legitimacy and motives unrelated to leadership influence, may also affect local authorities' ability to lead. 11 The described mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Our empirical identification of information signaling does not rule out the relevance of other drivers of leadership effects in the field.
9 Several laboratory experiments have investigated the importance of networks within the context of coordination games (Eckel & Wilson 2001 , 2007 and have shown that high status leaders affect equilibrium selection.
10 Formal authorities in our study setting attend workshops and meetings organized exclusively for local leaders and have experience making decisions on behalf of the community. Miller and Mobarak (2011) study this informational channel of leadership influence within the context of opinion leader influence on technology adoption decisions in Bangladesh. They show that when opinion leaders (including formal authorities) unanimously decide to adopt a new technology, the likelihood of adoption by other community members increases.
11 A small number of papers have have shown that legitimacy increases leadership influence and voluntary public good provision in laboratory settings (see, for example, Baldassarri & Grossman 2011; Levy et al. 2011) . Among motives that are unrelated to leadership, authorities could be more imaged concerned (Benabou & Tirole 2006) than non-authorities, and could value the public good more by virtue of the position they occupy in the social network (Nielson & Wichmann 2012) .
Experimental design
We employ a between-subject design with three treatments that (a) identifies the effect authorities have on voluntary public good provision when they lead by example, (b) distinguishes the influence of the example set by authorities and non-authorities in the community, and (c) isolates the importance of one of the most studied mechanisms behind leadership by example: information signaling about the quality of the public good. Before turning to the details of the experiment and its implementation, we describe the study setting, which informs our design.
Study setting
The experiment was conducted in 52 communities located in the Rio Grande-Valles Cruceños region of Bolivia, in collaboration with a non-governmental organization, Fundación Natura. The setting is useful for the study of leadership by example in public good provision for three reasons. First, decentralization in Bolivia extends all the way to community level administrative units called Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTBs).
12 OTBs are independent social and political units; in our study setting they are small in size, meet regularly as a group, and are poorly integrated with outside markets. Each OTB has an elected representative (OTB president) who serves as the formal authority in the community. OTB presidents are elected in public meetings through majority vote. They are in charge of requesting funds from the municipal government, of developing local projects, of interacting with outsiders, and of organizing collective work. The fact that these authorities exist in all communities allows us to analyze the behavior of OTB presidents both in and out of a contribution leadership role.
Second, a detailed census of 130 communities was conducted in the area by Fundación Natura in 2010. The census includes household and community level information that facilitated the randomization of communities and households into treatment, and provides us with the controls used in our analysis of experimental results.
Third, political parties and organizations have little presence in the area.
13 Anecdotal
12
We use the term OTB and community interchangeably in the remainder of the paper because each community in our study is considered a separate OTB. Communities in the study sample contained an average of 26 households.
13 Sixty percent of households in our study (located in 51 communities) indicated in the 2010 census that political syndicates do not exists at the OTB level. Six out of 41 local authorities indicated that they attend political syndicate meetings, but none indicated that they have occupied authority positions at the syndicate level in the past. Only 4 out of the 580 individuals who participated in our study indicated that they had evidence indicates that OTB presidents do not actively seek office and have no intention of pursuing a political career. They accept the authority position when selected by their peers, but find the responsibility costly in terms of the effort and time. We consider this beneficial for our study because it mitigates political factors that might confound our experimental design.
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The experimental design uses a naturally occurring decision setting -a community meeting -to solicit contributions to environmental education books for the local school.
15 Environmental education books were chosen as the public good in our experiment for several reasons. First, all communities in our study have a local primary school. Second, 40 percent of households in our study site identified environmental protection as one of the top values that should be taught to children in the community. All communities are located inside a watershed that was declared protected in 2007 due to severe soil erosion caused by agricultural practices. Environmental issues such as trash, water pollution, and soil erosion are thus very salient in the area. Third, although environmental education books are not a pure public good, they exhibit several relevant characteristics: books are non-excludable,
16
generate social spillovers, and impose a positive externality on anyone who cares about the provision of environmental education material in the local school.
From a practical perspective, books made it possible for us to examine voluntary contributions to a local public good in a setting in which even small contributions could ensure positive levels of provision. They also minimized trust confounds by allowing us to deliver the public good on site at the end of the experiment. The books used in the experiment were purchased from a non-government organization that specializes in producing environmental education material in Bolivia. Seven different books were available, and were sold at a zero-profit price of 10 Bs. per book.
17
held authority positions at the syndicate level.
14 It also may increase the likelihood of observing leadership by example effects in our setting. Given the lack of evidence on leadership by example in the field, establishing its empirical relevance is best done in a setting where it is likely to affect public good provision.
15 Community meetings occur regularly in our study setting, and are organized through local authorities to address community business or at the request of outside individuals or organizations. We followed the standard approach to organizing a meeting, and therefore consider it a natural decision setting.
16 All community members can have access to the education material available in the local school. Teachers are present in the school during weekdays and can grant school access. Community authorities and members of the parent-teacher association also have keys to grant school access when teachers or school administrators are not present.
17 The books included colored images and text with questionnaires to check the reader's understanding. Qualitative evidence gathered through focus group discussions at the pilot stage indicates that most participants perceived the value of the public good to be high. They described the books as addressing an
Treatments
Our experiment employs a between-subject design with three treatments. In each treatment, subjects complete a survey in exchange for money and are subsequently given the opportunity to make a voluntary contribution to environmental education books for the local school.
The treatments vary the way in which community members make voluntary contribution decisions. In a No Leader Treatment (NL), individuals make private simultaneous contributions to the local public good. In a Random Leader Treatment (RL), a randomly selected individual is asked to make his or her voluntary contribution publicly. In an Authority Leader Treatment (AL), the formal community authority is asked to make his or her voluntary contribution publicly. In both the RL and AL treatments, other participants make private voluntary contribution decisions after observing the contribution leader's public choice.
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The NL treatment establishes a benchmark scenario that we use as control in our experiment. Comparison of NL and AL determines if local authorities affect voluntary public good provision through their example. Comparison of the RL and AL treatments determines whether AL treatment effects are specific to authority leaders or are a generic response to leadership. We conduct two simultaneous treatments per community and use fixed effects to control for community characteristics that may affect both leader and follower contribution decisions.
The design introduces an information manipulation in all treatments that gives half of all participants, and always the contribution leader, the opportunity to inspect the public good before making a voluntary contribution decision.
19 The information manipulation identifies the extent to which information signaling about the quality of the public good explains leadership influence in this setting. If the leader's contribution conveys information about the value or quality of the public good then uninformed follower contributions should move in the direction of the leader's contribution (Vesterlund 2003; Potters et al. 2005 Potters et al. , 2007 Andreoni 2006) . The effect should be muted or reversed for informed followers, who do not need to rely on the leader's contribution to update their beliefs about the quality of important topic, of high quality, and appealing to children. 18 We use the term contribution leader to refer to the first mover: the randomly selected individual in the RL treatment and the authority in the AL treatment.
19 The information manipulation was implemented in such a way that informed agents knew who else was able to inspect the public good, but uninformed agents had no knowledge of the informational advantage possessed by others. the public good.
20 Comparison of uninformed and informed follower decisions within treatment tell us whether information signaling about the quality of the public good drives the effect that leaders have on follower contributions. Comparison across treatments informs us about the differential importance that information signaling has for each type of contribution leader. While several mechanisms discussed in Section 2 generate similar predictions across leadership treatments, none other than information signaling result in a differential follower response by information condition.
Randomization
We used household and OTB level data from the 2010 census of study communities to balance treatment assignment. OTBs included in the census but missing OTB-level information or without a local primary school were excluded from our study, as were communities smaller than 15 or greater than 80 households in size. The final eligible sample consisted of 52 OTBs.
OTBs were randomly assigned to one of three possible pairwise combinations of the NL, RL and AL treatments and 12 households from each community were randomly sampled for participation. The randomization balance for OTB and household variables was tested for each of 1000 draws and the draw with the minimum maximum t-statistic for any single variable was used as the final study sample (Bruhn & McKenzie 2009) . 21 The largest resulting t-statistic associated with treatment assignment was 1.50, associated with balance by municipality. The randomization process delivered both balanced characteristics across treatment and a representative sample of households for participation in the study.
Implementation
The study team visited each community 4 to 7 days prior to the intervention. The team met with community leaders, scheduled the experiment, and delivered invitations to a "meeting organized by researchers from Universities in the United States." 22 Written invitations were delivered in person to the heads of the 12 households selected through the randomization process in each community, which always included the OTB president.
23 At the time of invitation, individuals were told that they could earn up to 45 Bs. for attending the meeting and that only one person per household could attend. 24 On the day of the experiment, invited households were reminded of the time and location of the meeting. If households informed the study staff that they would not attend, a new household identified from the list of alternates generated through randomization was invited to participate.
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Two types of attrition affect the final study sample. The first is selection into the study, which occurred before the experimental session was conducted and does not affect the internal validity of our results. Appendix table A.1 provides a description of how the sample of households selected through randomization differs from the final sample of participants. The second is selection into treatment, which occurred in 6 sessions assigned to the authority leader treatment (AL), where the authority was not present on the day of the experiment.
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These sessions were run with either the NL or RL treatment (whichever was not assigned to the other concurrent session in the same community). In four cases, to preserve balance in the number of sessions across treatments, the next available community scheduled to receive a combination of RL and NL treatments received an unplanned AL treatment. These incidents are documented in Appendix table A.2.
Selection into treatment is potentially problematic for our empirical strategy.
27 Authority absences, however, seem to have been idiosyncratic. Authorities were not present the day of the experiment because they had to attend classes in the municipal capital, had to take care of medical emergencies, or were away harvesting crops. No systematic differences between 22 Community meetings in the study area are always organized with community leaders. We did not use the word experiment and deliberately called sessions meetings to minimize potential experimenter demand effects.
23 Attrition could occur at the invitation stage if a household selected through randomization could not be located for invitation delivery. A household selected for participation required a substitute at the invitation stage if it had moved from the community or if no adult representative was available. A list of randomly chosen substitute households was used to identify replacements.
24 45 Bs. is approximately 6.50 US dollars and is equal to the daily wage for agricultural work in the study setting.
25 In select cases, no alternates from the list were available and substitutions were based on convenience. Convenience replacements were made in 19 cases.
26 In 5 communities the authority was not present in the community to participate in the experiment. In one community the authority refused to participate.
27 Specifically, the types of communities in which authorities were absent are systematically less likely to appear in the within-community comparisons of AL and the other treatments, while the RL-NL comparison is more likely to occur.
sessions selected into and out of treatment are detected in our data (see Appendix table A.2). We show balance on the characteristics of participants for the final experimental sample in Appendix table A.3. The Authority Leader treatment has fewer females, and participants in the No Leader treatment have slightly fewer assets. These results persist when community fixed effects are included and are partly driven by the fact that authorities differ from other communities on a number of observable characteristics, and are more often present in the AL treatment (See Appendix table A.4). We control for these and other observable characteristics throughout our analysis of experimental results.
Each experimental session consisted of three parts and took place at the local school or in another centrally located community building. Throughout the implementation, efforts were made to keep the process similar to a typical community meeting.
In Part 1 of the meeting, individuals arrived to the designated meeting place, registered, received an envelope, an ID number, and consent forms. IDs ranging from 0 to 11 were distributed at random to participants with the exception of ID 0, which was always given to the OTB authority.
28 Subjects were then informed that they would earn 35 Bs. by completing a questionnaire and 10 Bs. by attending the full meeting. At the time of soliciting consent, subjects knew that they would be asked survey questions but were not aware that they would be asked to make a voluntary contribution decision. Part 1 of the experiment took approximately 20 minutes.
In Part 2, subjects were split into two groups based on their ID number, which allowed more seating space for each of the participants while also facilitating the implementation of two simultaneous treatments. The experimenter and assistant were rotated to ensure balance across treatments. In each group, subjects completed a survey containing questions unrelated to the study in exchange for their experimental earnings.
29 Questions were read out loud to participants, who answered using paper and pencil.
Regardless of the answers provided, all subjects were given 35 Bs. in 5 Bs. coins upon completion of the survey. Participants with even ID numbers were then asked to step out of the room; contribution leaders always had even ID numbers. Even numbered subjects were shown the environmental education books and given the opportunity to inspect them, but were not told how the books would be used in the session. Subjects with odd ID numbers were not told the purpose of this interruption, but were asked to answer one additional survey question to pass the time.
30 Participants with even IDs returned to the room after 5 minutes.
Following the information manipulation, the contribution decision was presented to subjects. Subjects were told that the money earned by completing the survey was theirs to keep and that they could contribute as much or as little as they wanted to environmental education books for the local school. Books were displayed in front of the room and subjects were given general information about their cost and content. They were informed that for every 10 Bs. contributed by all community members (in both sessions of the experiment) the school would receive one book.
31 Participants knew that 7 different volumes of the books were available and that they would be delivered on-site at the end of the experiment.
To make their voluntary contributions, subjects were asked to place the money they wished to contribute in an envelope that had their ID number marked on the inside. Contribution decisions were done in private behind a cardboard partition. If the session was assigned the Random Leader or the Authority Leader treatment, the contribution leaderreferred to by his or her ID number -was asked to demonstrate the process to others and to publicly announce the amount of his or her contribution as it was placed in the envelope. All other participants were called one by one to make their private voluntary contribution in the back of the room. 32 The order by which subjects were called upon to make their contributions depended on the seating arrangement. Participants were not allowed to talk while contribution decisions were being made.
After all participants made their contributions, subjects were asked to complete a survey with 6 questions on household socio-demographics and perceptions of teaching quality in the local school.
33 Once the final survey was completed, subjects received a 10 Bs. show up fee.
This marked the conclusion of part 2, which took approximately 60 minutes.
30 The additional survey question asked participants to indicate the communities they had visited the previous year. None of the 580 participants questioned the purpose of the interruption.
31 Participants were additionally informed that contributions would be rounded up if the total amount contributed by all participants was not a multiple of 10. This ensured that we never kept any of the contributions made by subjects.
32 All subjects knew at the time they were making their contribution decisions that their contributions would not be revealed to anyone, including the local authority. This was done to ensure that contributions would not be affected by anticipated sanctioning. 33 The purpose of these questions was to collect individual-level information that was not available through the census or was outdated. The census was conducted almost a year before the experiment and asked questions only to the household head.
Part 3 of the experiment started once both experimental sessions were over. All participants returned to the same room and the total amount contributed by subjects was announced. The environmental education books were counted in public and given to the community authority or school representative in front of all subjects. The final part of the experiment took approximately 10 minutes. The entire session lasted between 90 and 120 minutes.
Results
We observe the decisions of 580 subjects in 104 sessions of the experiment, which were conducted between May and July 2011. Each session included between 4 and 6 subjects; a total of 9 to 12 individuals participated in the experiment in each of the 52 communities included in our sample. Figure 1 shows histograms that describe the distribution of contribution decisions by participant type and experimental treatment.
34 Panel (a) combines all participants and shows that 5 and 10 Bs. constitute the most common contribution levels across treatments. A contribution of 5 Bs. is the median contribution in the study population and the minimum non-zero contribution level. Ten Bs, on the other hand, is the smallest contribution that has a direct impact on the provision of the public good. 35 The AL treatment shows first order stochastic dominance over the RL treatment, which in turn dominates the NL treatment.
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Panels (b) and (c) break contributions down by participant type. This presentation of raw data suggests that authority leaders give more than individuals randomly selected to lead by example (Panel b), and contribution leaders make higher contributions than do followers (Panel b vs. c).
37
Although the raw data suggests that public good provision increases in the presence of a leader, these results are informative only of aggregate outcomes. Observable and unob-34 Contributions are classified in 5 Bs. bins that reflect the monetary unit used to pay subjects in the experiment. A small number of subjects made contributions using their own coins. These are rounded to the closest 5 Bs. interval in Figure 1 but not in the remainder of the analysis.
35 Ten Bs. is also the value of the show-up fee, which could induce artificially high focal contributions of 10 Bs. The modal contribution of 5 Bs. in the no leader treatment implies that this is highly unlikely.
36 Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum tests reject the null hypothesis that the contributions of all participants in AL and NL or RL and NL were drawn from the same underlying distribution (p < 0.01 and p < 0.10 respectively). Differences between AL and RL are not statistically significant; but the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum test has a p-value p < 0.15.
37 Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum tests provide p-values <0.05 and <0.01 respectively.
servable factors that drive both leader and follower contributions need to be accounted for.
To quantify treatment effects parametrically we regress contributions on the experimental treatments and a vector of individual-and session-level controls. All regressions include community fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the community level. Community fixed effects address any spurious correlation between leader and follower giving, driven by unobservable community-level factors. Even with fixed effects, controlling for individualand session-level characteristics is important given the imbalance discussed in Section 3.
We estimate treatment effects using three different specifications, which we describe generally here and in detail immediately preceding each set of results. First, to examine changes in mean contributions, we consider a continuous measure of contributions and estimate treatment effects using ordinary least squares. Second, we take into account that the experiment was implemented using 5 Bs. coins. To address the resulting bunching, we implement an ordered logit model in which each 5 Bs. interval constitutes a separate categorical giving bin.
38
Third, given that the greatest mass of contributions occurs at 5 and 10 Bs. (see Figure1) treatment effects may be concentrated around the median level of giving. We therefore estimate treatment effects on the probability of giving above the median (≥ 10 Bs). We revert to OLS for the median regressions. However, our results are qualitatively similar if we use a conditional logit model with fixed effects instead.
In our main analyses, we assume that the selection documented in the implementation section is idiosyncratic. Robustness checks that address selection into treatment, including an instrumental variables correction and a sample restriction to the compliant sub-sample of communities, are presented in Section 4.3. They are consistent with our main results.
Main results
We begin by analyzing the effect of leadership by example on total and individual contributions, then split the analysis to focus on the behavior of leaders and on the response of followers. We explore treatment heterogeneities that help to explain the mechanisms under-lying the main results next and conclude our analysis with a series of robustness checks. All tables show OLS and ordered logit estimates, include fixed effects, and show results with and without controls, though we focus on the specifications that include controls in our discussion of the results.
Total contributions
We begin by estimating:
where y ic represents the contribution made by individual i in community c, AL denotes the Authority Leader treatment, RL the Random Leader treatment, X ic is the vector of individual-and session-level controls shown in the balance table, η c is a community fixed effect, and ic is an error term clustered at the community level.
Results are show in Table 1 . Columns 1 and 2 show estimates aggregated at the session level, where i indexes the experimental session and X ic is a vector of average session-level characteristics. Having an authority lead by example increases the total contributions in an experimental session by 9.11 Bs. Treatment effects differ by the type of contribution leader. Community members randomly selected to lead by example do not affect total contributions to the public good (columns 1 through 6). Random leaders do, however, increase the probability that contributions exceed the median by approximately 9 percent (s.e. 0.06, column 8). As shown by the p-value for a test of the equality, the RL and AL coefficients are statistically significantly different from each other in all but the linear probability model of giving 10 Bs. or more (columns 7 and 8). Leadership by example therefore has a consistent and positive impact on public good provision when an elected local authority leads.
Having established that authorities increase total contributions when they lead by example, we turn next to the analysis of why authorities increase public good provision -whether the effect is driven by their own contributions, the contributions of their followers or both.
Leader contributions
To examine how authority and randomly selected contribution leaders adjust their behavior when leading by example, we compare each type of leader's contribution behavior when they lead and when they give in private. We restrict our analysis to leaders in the RL and AL treatments and to individuals in the NL treatment, which includes elected authorities. The NL participants thus form a counterfactual for leader behavior, when contribution decisions are private. We regress contribution decisions on leadership treatment and authority status:
where Authority ic represents an indicator for whether individual i in community c is the elected authority, and all other variables use the same notation described in equation 1. The coefficient on Authority ic captures any difference in contribution behavior between authorities and other community members when they give in private. The coefficients on the RL ic and AL ic treatment indicators reflect the change in contribution behavior displayed by random individuals and authorities when they give in public relative to non-authorities who give in private in the no leader treatment. The regression is analogous to a difference in difference set up that includes leadership position and authority status, where AL represents the total effect for an authority in a contribution leadership position. The regression does not describe differences in the contribution behavior of authorities across treatments because community fixed effects are used and authorities are always present in either the NL or AL treatment. With this caveat in mind, the test for Authority public = private reported in the last row of Table 2 tests whether authority contributions are significantly different when they are made in public in the AL treatment from when they are made in private in the NL treatment. Table 2 shows that both authorities and non-authorities increase their contributions when they lead by example. Authorities give 6.09 Bs. (s.e. 2.35) more when they lead by example than the average individual in the NL treatment (Columns 1 and 2). Randomly selected contribution leaders, on the other hand, give an additional 1.64 Bs. (s.e. 1.39). In all specifications, the coefficient on AL (β 1 ) is larger in magnitude than the coefficient on RL (β 2 ). The difference between authority and non-authority leader contributions is marginally significant in some specifications, which suggests that part of the total increase in public good provision generated by the AL treatment is explained by the direct effect of the contribution of authorities who lead by example.
Interestingly, the differences between authority and non-authority giving arise solely in response to leadership. The coefficient on the authority status indicator (δ) is small and imprecisely estimated, indicating that authority contributions are not different from the contributions of other community members when they contribute privately in the NL treatment. The final row of Table 2 shows that the difference in authority contributions in public and in private is imprecisely estimated, though large in magnitude.
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Follower contributions
Now we turn to the behavior of followers to test whether they respond to the contribution decisions of leaders, and whether the response differs by leader type. We exclude contribution leaders from the analysis and compare the contribution behavior of followers in RL and AL treatment to individuals who contribute privately in NL.
40 The estimating equation is:
where y ic represents the contribution made by follower i in community c, and y T c for T ∈ {AL, RL} represents the contribution made by the contribution leader in treatment T . The effect of the different leader types cannot be completely separated from the fact that leader type (RL or AL) is correlated with leader contribution decisions and leader characteristics in our experimental setting (as shown in Appendix table A.4). Thus, treatment effects on followers should be interpreted as the combined effect of the leader type, leader characteristics, and an endogenous leader contribution.
41
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show OLS estimates of equation (3) with a continuous measure of leader contribution on the right hand side. The linear effect of continuous leader contri-39 It is important to note that we only observe 8 authorities giving in the NL treatment, so the authority status indicator variable is identified off of a very small number of observations, resulting in large standard errors.
40 As noted in the preceding analysis of leader contribution decisions, some NL treatments included local authorities. Controlling for the presence of an authority not in the contribution leader role does not substantially change any of the results. 41 We chose not to exogenously vary the amount authorities and non-authorities give when they lead by example because doing so would require letting subjects know that the leader is not freely choosing the amount they wish to contribute (in order to avoid using deception). This may generate a different response to leadership by example and would not be able to capture the leader response to leadership opportunities that we analyze in the previous sub-section.
butions on follower giving is statistically insignificant for both authority leaders (AL×leader contribution) and randomly selected leaders (RL×leader contribution), as are the level effects of the leadership treatments (AL and RL). The specification is restrictive in that it estimates the average effect of an increase in leader contributions on follower responses. Potential theories underlying a leadership by example effect require neither monotonicity nor linearity. Before turning to the categorical measures of leader giving used in the rest of Table 3 , we examine the less parametric analyses presented in Figure 2 , which shows the marginal effects of leader contributions on follower giving, including a quadratic term. The relationship is imprecisely estimated in Panel (a), where follower response is continuous, but is similar and more precise when follower response is binary in Panel (b). Specifically, Figure2 suggests that authority leader contributions have an approximately linear effect on the probability that followers give above the median (≥ 10Bs.), while random leader contributions have a concave effect that is increasing up to 10 Bs. To accommodate these non-linearities the remainder of Table 3 tests for asymmetries in the response to high and low leader contribution, with the split at 10 Bs.
We examine the effect of high and low leader contributions on continuous follower contributions in columns 3 and 4 and categorical giving levels in columns 5 through 8. Authority leaders who give less than 10 Bs. (coefficient on AL) insignificantly decrease follower giving by approximately 1.12 Bs. (s.e. 0.88, column 4) relative to the NL treatment. They significantly decrease the log odds that followers give an additional coin by 1.08 (s.e. 0.39, column 6), and significantly reduce the probability that follower contributions exceed the median by 19 percent (s.e. 0.08, column 8). Relative to a lower authority leader contribution, a high AL contribution has a positive and significant effect on follower contributions. Specifically, a follower of an authority who gives above the median gives 1.4 more Bs. (insignificant, column 4), has a significant 1.3 greater log odds of giving an additional coin and is 34 percent more likely to also give above the median than is a follower who observes an authority leader contribute below the median.
Is the influence of authorities on followers different than that of randomly selected community members who lead by example? In general, the coefficients on the random leader treatment variables in Table 3 are of the same sign, smaller magnitude and less precisely estimated than the corresponding authority leader effects. Column 8 shows that a random leader who gives at least 10 Bs. increases the probability that followers give at least 10 Bs. by 12.1 percent (s.e. 0.06), which is the only specification in which random leaders can be seen to have a significant influence over follower contributions. In spite of the relatively more consistent influence of authority leaders, the differences between the random and authority leader effects are statistically indistinguishable; p-values from the relevant t-tests are reported in the table. In neither case is the response of followers consistent with free riding: both authority and random leaders show some evidence of positively affecting follower contributions.
Heterogeneous treatment effects
We turn next to the question of why leadership affects voluntary contributions in our setting, by exploring treatment heterogeneities in both leader and follower contribution decisions. First, we test whether followers' response to the leader's example differs based on their exposure to information. Second, we examine heterogeneities in leader influence based on the observable characteristics of leaders.
Followers: Information signaling
Recall that the information manipulation generated exogenous variation in the information available to study participants about the quality of the public good in all treatments. If leadership by example serves as an information signal, then the contribution decision of session leaders should influence informed and uninformed followers differently. Specifically, the contributions of uninformed followers should demonstrate a more positive correlation with the contribution decisions of the leader, because uninformed followers are more dependent on the quality information conveyed by the leader's decision than are informed followers. Table  4 replicates the analysis conducted in columns 3 to 8 of Table 3 , but adds an additional interaction to differentiate between followers who did and did not have the opportunity to inspect the public good. We break the results out by information condition and show total effects for uninformed and informed followers relative to the contribution decisions of uninformed followers in the No Leader treatment. Note that informed and uninformed followers in the NL treatment make statistically indistinguishable contributions. In Table 4 , the treatment effects are followed by a series of p-values, shown at the bottom of the table, from tests of the equality of coefficients across information conditions and by leader type.
Beginning with uninformed followers, the top panel of Table 4 shows that an authority leader who makes a low initial contribution (less than 10 Bs.) insignificantly decreases the average contributions made by uninformed followers by 1.04 Bs. (s.e. 1.17), significantly lowers the log odds that follower contributions fall in the next categorical giving bin by 1.44 (s.e. 0.77) and significantly decreases the probability that followers give at least 10 Bs. by 29.3 percent (s.e. 0.16). An authority who makes a high initial contribution, on the other hand, insignificantly increases average uninformed follower contributions and the log odds that followers contribute an additional coin, but significantly increases the probability of giving above the median by 14.4 percent (s.e. 0.08). Authorities therefore influence uninformed follower contribution decisions. They decrease follower giving when they set a negative example as leader, but also increase the probability that followers give above the median when their contributions are high. Random leaders do not affect the contributions of uninformed followers when they make low contributions, but are just as influential as authorities when they make initial contributions of 10 Bs. or more.
As shown in the middle panel, the effects on informed followers are rather different. The negative effect of low authority leader contributions becomes statistically insignificant. High authority leader contributions, however, continue to affect the probability that followers give above the median, with a similar magnitude and statistical significance as in the case of uniformed followers. AL treatment effects are not significantly different across informed and uninformed followers. For random leaders, the results are reversed. While uninformed followers were unresponsive to low leader contributions, informed followers make significantly lower contributions when the leader makes a low contribution.
42 High contributions from random leaders do not increase the contributions of informed followers, as they did for uninformed followers, though the difference in the coefficient is significant only in one specification.
Overall, the analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects on the basis of information shows four things. First, the leadership influence exerted by random leaders is consistent with information signaling: random leaders who make high contributions increase the likelihood that uninformed but not informed followers make contributions that exceed the median. Second, the patterns of authority influence cannot be fully explained by information signaling. While the negative influence of a low authority contribution appears to be mitigated by exogenous information provision, high authority contributions increase the contributions of even informed followers.
43 The first two results can be seen in the t-tests for the difference in the effects on uninformed and informed followers, which are significant in a number of 42 The effect that random leaders who make low contributions have on informed followers is inconsistent with the predictions of information signaling about the quality of the public good, but could be explained by normative component of information signaling or non-information channels such as reciprocity and conformism. 43 The persistent influence of authority leaders over even informed followers could be explained by a superior information signal, for which inspecting the books is not a good substitute. We therefore cannot rule out that information signaling fully explains the results, though the nature of the signal offered by random and authority leaders must differ. specifications for random leaders but never for authorities leaders. Third, while uninformed followers are marginally more likely to be influenced by a low authority leader contribution than by a low random leader contribution, informed followers are not differentially responsive to leaders of different types. These differences disappear when contributions are high; random leaders who contribute 10 Bs. or more are just as likely to influence followers as are authorities. Generally, these tests take us to the edge of what the study is powered to investigate, and we interpret the differences as suggestive evidence of a role of information signaling in leadership by example, which appears more prevalent among random leaders than among authority leaders.
Leaders: Individual characteristics
As discussed in Section 3, authorities differ from the average community member on a number of dimensions, including gender, education, assets, and community participation (see Appendix table A.4). As a result, the influence of authority leaders may be driven not by the position that they hold in the community but by their observable characteristics. Some relevant traits, such as education and wealth, may allow leaders to generate better information signals, trigger more reciprocity, and have stronger social influence regardless of their status as elected authorities. Holding an authority position may, on the other hand, convey an additional influence that extends beyond the observable characteristics of the leader.
Though our study is not designed to explicitly investigate how the observable characteristics of leaders explain leadership influence, we take advantage of the fact that randomly selected contribution leaders vary in the degree to which they resemble the average elected authority. We construct an "authority propensity score" using a probit regression of authority status on the five characteristics where authorities significantly differ from the rest of the community: gender, education, wealth, participation in community meetings and trust in NGOs.
44 Each contribution leader is assigned an authority propensity score between 0 and 1, which describes the resemblance of each contribution leader to the average authority in the study.
The top panel of Figure 3 shows how leader contributions vary with leader characteristics and types by plotting the marginal effects from a regression of leader contributions on 44 Note that authorities differ from the rest of the population on several participation-related characteristics, including participation in OTB meetings and projects, and agreement with OTB decisions. We focus on one of these to avoid redundancy. Each of the covariates used in the probit regression is balanced after imposing common supports. We implement the propensity score matching using the algorithm developed by Becker & Ichino (2002) . authority propensity score interacted with leader treatment that includes community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the community level. The figure shows that random leaders give less than authority leaders in general, with contributions that are increasing in their authority propensity score. The slope of the random leader regression is positive but statistically insignificant. The giving gap between authority leaders and random leaders, however, narrows as the authority propensity scores increases, suggesting that the positive influence random leaders exert when their contributions are high (see Table 3 ) may be coming both from their observable characteristics and the amount they contribute as leaders. Since the authority propensity score was generated from the sample of authority leaders included in the regression, we plot the authority leader results only to provide a basis for comparison. The slope of the authority leader regression is negative, but statistically insignificant.
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To more directly examine the relationship between leader characteristics and leader influence, we construct a new outcome variable: the absolute difference between leader and follower contributions. The lower panel of Figure 3 shows the marginal effects from a regression of this measure of leader influence on an interaction of authority propensity score and leadership treatment, controlling for the leader contribution amount, individual and session level characteristics and community fixed effects, and with standard errors clustered at the community level. The figure shows that random leaders are more influential the more they look like the typical authority in the study. The slope of the authority propensity score among random leaders is marginally significant (p = 0.102). Together, the results in Figure 3 highlight two factors underlying leadership by example in our setting. First, random leaders are more influential if they resemble authorities, both because they give more as leaders and because of their characteristics. Second, at least some of the influence that authorities have when they lead by example is driven by their observable characteristics. This last point may indicate that communities choose their leaders based, in part, on observable characteristics that are correlated with influential leadership.
Robustness checks
We use two types of robustness checks to address possible selection bias resulting from noncompliance with the assigned treatment in some communities, as mentioned in Section 4. First, we present two stage least square estimates of treatment effects that use treatment assignment to the AL treatment as an instrument for administered AL treatment, as follows:
The fitted values AL ic are obtained from the first stage regression
where D ic is an indicator for assignment to the AL treatment for individual i in community c. Second, we restrict our analysis to the sample of communities that complied with treatment assignment and estimate treatment effects directly as in our main specifications.
Appendix table A.5 presents revised estimates of treatment effects on total contributions. Overall, the results look similar to the main specifications, and are stronger under the instrumental variables specification in most cases. This strengthening of the results under the IV specification is due to the relatively low contributions among the four replacement authority leaders. The limited sample analysis sometimes lacks statistical power because of the loss of sample size. The same robustness specifications are carried out for the leader and follower results. These are presented in Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 respectively, and are also consistent with our main results.
Conclusion
Local authorities in developing countries often wield substantial power, and some evidence shows large authority fixed-effects in community development outcomes, including the provision of public goods (Chattopadhyay & Duflo 2004; Miguel & Gugerty 2005) . What role do local authorities play? Do they help communities overcome collective action problems and sustain higher levels of voluntary public good provision? If so, how? A number of channels present themselves: sanctioning or rule enforcement, moral suasion, liaison with outside resources, reciprocity, and leadership by example. Our study offers novel evidence on the latter mechanism.
We implement small group experiments in 52 communities in rural Bolivia to examine the role that locally elected authorities play in the voluntary provision of public goods when they lead by example. In our setting, authorities exert a significant influence over voluntary public good provision even without the ability to monitor, sanction or coerce. On average, public good provision increases by approximately 20 percent when the group is led by an elected authority who makes an initial public contribution. In our setting, authorities significantly increase their contribution decisions when they lead by example relative to contributions in a private, simultaneous decision setting where their contributions do not differ from those of the average community member. Authorities also influence the contribution decisions of followers, to a marginally greater extent than do random individuals who lead by example.
Our design explores one of the best-studied mechanisms underlying a positive effect of leadership by example on public good provision: information signaling. We find that the predictions of information signaling are consistent with the influence that randomly selected contribution leaders have on their followers, but do little to explain the influence of elected authorities. The additional influence of local authorities who lead by example suggests an information signal that goes above and beyond the information manipulation offered in the experiment, and with other channels such as reciprocity, legitimacy, and social influence. Further research is needed to identify other mechanisms by which leadership by example affects voluntary public good provision in field settings and to investigate how the observable characteristics of individuals correlate with channels of leadership influence. We generate suggestive evidence in this direction by showing that leader characteristics play an important role in determining their influence over followers. Our results highlight the multiple facets of the differential influence that authorities wield; in addition to the formal position that they hold within the community, authorities also make higher contributions when given the opportunity to lead and have different observable characteristics than the average community member.
Methodologically, our study offers an innovative approach to studying endogenously arising behavior within groups in field settings. The inclusion of community fixed effects allows us to address many of concerns associated with unobservable similarities between leaders and their followers within communities. We also employ best practices in a number of other design features, including precise measurement of selection in to the study, playing a voluntary contribution mechanism with earned money rather than house money, and making contributions to an actual public good. Combining the rigor and insights of laboratory studies with the complexities of social interactions in the field offers a promising direction for future research. Particularly where leadership is concerned, stepping outside of the laboratory can generate insights about how actual leaders influence their followers and how the characteristics of individuals and groups interact.
While taking the study of leadership by example to the field offers a number of benefits, it also has some drawbacks. Most notably for our study, some communities were unable to comply with treatment assignment. The differences between the OLS results and the IV robustness checks suggest potential selection associated with the experimental treatments. We choose to lead with the OLS results given that treatment non-compliance appears idiosyncratic and the IV strategy strengthens our findings in most cases. Another area where the study gives up some control is the endogeneity of leader contributions. While the use of community fixed effects eliminates endogeneity concerns at the community level, they may still exist at the session level. We test for session level correlates of leader contributions and find only one significant explanatory variable out of 13 tested.
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Like all field studies, we generate evidence for a particular area of Bolivia at a particular point in time. By testing specific causal mechanisms, nevertheless, we identify what may be more generalizable results on the role of information signaling in shaping leader influence over public good provision. In other settings, with less decentralization or with more corrupt leaders, other actors within the community may be relatively more influential. Our results hold constant other means of influence that authorities have at their disposal, such as sanctioning power, which may be relatively more or less important than leadership by example in sustaining the voluntary provision of local public goods in different settings. While other studies have described the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and local public good provision (e.g. Miguel & Gugerty 2005) , our study is relatively homogeneous, making issues such as ethnic tensions less relevant. Leader characteristics, which play a role in shaping influence in our setting, may be even more important in settings with greater heterogeneity. 
Tests (p-values)
Notes: N = 510. Columns 1-2 and 5-6 show OLS estimates. Columns 3-4 show ordered logit estimates. See text for details. The excluded category is uninformed subjects in NL. All specifications include community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. Controls refer to the full set of individual and session level controls shown in the balance table. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. (1) Notes: Columns 1-3 show means with standard deviations in brackets for sample of participants at each stage of of the experiment. The column "Diff." shows the mean difference in between households that were eligible and those that participated, with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are for a two-sided t-test: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. See text for discussion of covariates omitted from the table. Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show OLS estimates of treatment effects on total session contributions. Columns 3-4 and 6-7 show OLS estimate of treatment effects on individual contributions. Column 5 shows odds rations from an ordered logit regression (see text for details). IV indicates that 2SLS instrumental variable analysis was used. Limited sample indicates that the sample of observations is restricted to communities that complied with treatment assignment. All specifications include community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the community level. Controls refer to the full set of individual and session level controls shown in the balance table. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Total Individual Continuous
Continuous ! 10 Bs. 
Tests (p-values)
Note: The sample consists of individuals who led by example in RL and AL treatments and all subjects in the NL treatment. Authority refers OTB presidents in NL. Columns 1-2 and 4-5 present OLS estimates. Column 3 shows odds ratios from an ordered logit regression (see text for details). IV indicates that 2SLS instrumental variable analysis was used. Limited sample indicates that the sample of observations is restricted to communities that complied with treatment assignment. All regressions include community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. Controls refer to the full set of individual and session level controls shown in the balance table. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Notes: The sample consists of followers in the RL and AL treatments and all contributors in the NL treatment. Columns 1-4 and 6-7 show OLS estimates. Column 5 shows log odds ratios from an ordered logit regression with fixed effects (see text for details). IV indicates that 2SLS instrumental variable analysis was used. Limited sample indicates that the sample of observations is restricted to communities that complied with treatment assignment. All specifications include community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. Controls refer to the full set of individual and session level controls shown in the balance table. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
